Geographically concentrated industry activity creates pools of skilled labor, specialized suppliers, and increases opportunities for knowledge spillover. These agglomeration economies offer potential advantage for firms, but research exploring their strategic implications is incomplete. Therefore, we develop a three-layer framework of why firms agglomerate for each agglomeration economy. The first layer assesses the relative importance of skilled labor, suppliers, and knowledge spillovers. The second layer considers whether firms can enjoy the benefits that geographic concentration creates without co-locating. The final layer examines why some firms are more inclined to co-locate than others. Applying this framework, we tackle two central issues: (1) the relative attraction of labor pools, specialized suppliers and knowledge spillovers; and (2) how firm traits may drive strategic decisions to co-locate in pursuit of particular agglomeration economies. We test our framework on the U.S. location choices of new manufacturing entrants between 1985 and 1994 and find that skilled labor and specialized suppliers are much more attractive to firms than potential knowledge spillovers, even in R&D intensive industries; and that strong firms, who might be concerned about aiding proximate competitors, will still co-locate if their contributions to agglomeration economies are less fungible.
Introduction
suggests that locations thick with similar activity generate valuable agglomeration economies for firms, namely better access to skilled labor (labor market pooling), specialized suppliers (shared inputs), and knowledge spillover from competing firms. As a result, firms' choice of location may create competitive advantage by improving access to these key resources. More recently, business research has begun exploring why these agglomeration economies are more valuable to some firms than to others. Notably, Shaver and Flyer (2000) argue that large firms may be less inclined to co-locate because their presence would dramatically increase local economic activity, thereby reducing costs for neighboring competitors. Addressing potential knowledge spillovers specifically, Alcácer and Chung (2007) argue that the cost of knowledge lost to competitors depends upon whether competitors can absorb and use that knowledge. When competitors can't leverage the knowledge gleaned from technically advanced firms, industry leaders are free to enjoy the benefits of agglomeration without the attendant risk.
In order to more fully understand the firm-level implications of agglomeration economies, we develop a three-layer framework of determinants. The first layer prioritizes the relative value of labor pools, specialized suppliers and knowledge inflows using the welldeveloped economics literature on production functions. The second layer assesses whether firms can take advantage of agglomeration economies without joining the geographic concentration of firms that created those economies. The final layer examines how certain firm and agglomeration economy traits might increase the risks of aiding competitors, reducing the strategic value of agglomeration economies. Risk increases with how much proximate firms contribute to agglomeration economies, and with how readily competitors can make use of these contributions. Applying this framework, we address the fundamental issues of: (1) the relative attraction of each agglomeration economy and (2) when firms will strategically locate for each of them, based upon key dimensions of firm heterogeneity. We introduce measures for each agglomeration economy -share of industry employment, supplier-industry activity, and industry patent stock --which parallel recent work in economics.
1 For key dimensions of firm heterogeneity, we pair each agglomeration economy with a corresponding firm trait: response to pools of skilled labor and specialized suppliers changes with firms' relative economic output,;
response to knowledge spillovers changes with firms' technical capabilities. This pairing allows us to predict when various firms might be more or less attracted to a particular agglomeration economy.
We test our hypotheses with a sample of first-time foreign entrants to U.S. manufacturing industries between 1985 and 1994. 2 We focus on first-time entrants because incumbent firms have prior investments that may affect subsequent location choices and create dependence among observations by the same firm. To proxy for agglomeration economies, we use share of industry employment, supplier-industry activity, and industry patent stocks across locations, industries, and years. We find that industry employment and supplier activity are about 10 times more attractive than industry patent stocks, suggesting that, on average, firms are relatively unconcerned about gaining knowledge from nearby competitors (knowledge inflows). Similarly, we find that large firms are more wary of co-locating in the presence of skilled labor pools and specialized suppliers, and technically advanced firms are less wary of losing knowledge to 1 For example, Rosenthal and Strange (2001) examine differences in extent of agglomeration in U.S. manufacturing using levels of educational attainment, manufactured inputs as share of output value, and innovations per value of output. Ellison, Glaeser, and Kerr (2007) examine collocation of U.S. manufacturing industries using similarity in employment category arrays, extent of input-output links, and extent of patent citation links.
2 By looking at location choice, we evaluate how much value firms expect to gain by agglomerating (or not). The actual value might be evaluated after a move by examining performance measures, such as productivity. Examining location choices is crucial because performance is endogenous, in that actual performance will be partially driven by initial location choices.
competitors (knowledge outflows), because competing firms can hire from pools of skilled labor more readily than they can leverage knowledge gleaned from technically advanced competitors.
In the next section we consider firms' strategic reactions to agglomeration economies in three stages. First, we establish the baseline attractiveness of each agglomeration economy.
Second, we argue that some agglomeration economies are more location-specific, providing stronger incentive to co-locate. Third, we propose that certain firm traits will impact the propensity to co-locate: some firms are unable to access the agglomeration economies even if they attempt to do so. In later sections we explain our data, methods, and results. Finally, we highlight our findings and discuss implications for firm strategy.
Firm asymmetry for agglomeration economies
Marshall (1920) suggests three factors that reduce production costs for agglomerated firms: larger pools of skilled labor, more specialized suppliers, and knowledge inflows from competitors. The first two develop when increased local demand encourages specialization.
Unskilled workers are more likely to seek specialized training when local jobs are concentrated in the same industry. In turn, firms save time and money they would otherwise spend on training.
By the same logic, suppliers working alongside a concentration of same-industry firms are more likely to make industry-specific investments, reducing transportation and coordination costs for the firms they supply. Marshall's third agglomeration economy considers how firms combine inputs. Firms with similar products may have very different production processes, varying by capital and labor intensity, by how capital is paired with labor, and by how labor is organized and trained, among other things. Some of these processes will be more productive than others, and over time these best practices may spread to neighboring firms, improving efficiency and lowering costs.
As a source of reduced costs, Marshall's agglomeration economies have important implications for firm strategy: firms that benefit from agglomeration economies will have an advantage over competitors. Whether a firm benefits, in fact, from the agglomeration economies will depend upon three issues. First, skilled labor, specialized suppliers, and knowledge spillover have different values. Second, the level of localization required to access a specific agglomeration economy varies. Third, the value of a particular agglomeration economy will most likely vary by firm. Some firms will be more attracted to specialized labor, for example. Others may depend on knowledge inflows from technology leaders.
Are some agglomeration economies more valuable?
Before exploring firms' strategic response to each of Marshall's agglomeration economies, we must determine which of them firms value most. Because trained labor, specialized suppliers, and knowledge inflows can each lower firms' costs, we assume that, on average, firms will be drawn to all three. We expect the attractiveness of each economy will vary by its corresponding importance to a firm's production processes: the more important the input for creation of the final output, the more valuable the corresponding agglomeration economy.
To assess labor, suppliers, and knowledge as inputs, we use as a guide the empirical research on firms' production functions. Fundamental work by Griliches and Mairesse (1983) and Hall (1993) link the set of inputs consumed by firms to the output produced. Production functions typically include measures of capital, labor, materials, and R&D. Empirical work estimates these inputs' cost shares or weights, which reflect their relative contribution to output.
While there is certainly variation by industry, on average the estimates of these weights are largest for materials, followed by capital and labor, with R&D last. For example, when looking across all U.S. manufacturing from 1986 -1990 , Nadiri and Kim (1996 report cost shares for capital, labor, materials, and R&D of 13.5%, 14.1%, 64.2%, and 8.2%, respectively. These weights suggest that materials would be most important for firms' productive processes, followed by capital and labor, and then by R&D.
These production function weights give us a baseline from which we can determine the relative attractiveness of various agglomeration economies. Assuming that the more important the input, the more important the corresponding agglomeration economy, we would initially expect firms to value specialized suppliers (the source of materials) most, followed by skilled labor, and finally, R&D activity.
How important is each agglomeration economy for firms' location decisions?
The next step is considering how the relative importance of the agglomeration economies will affect firms' location choices. Initially, we would expect the relative draw of each economy to correspond to the value firms place on that economy -their corresponding production function weights. This baseline would be affected by the degree to which each economy is location specific. Agglomeration economies with greater location specificity -those based upon resources that are more scarce and/or resources that are difficult to transfer via markets -would provide a stronger incentive to co-locate. Adams and Jaffe (1996) demonstrate that localized R&D spending (within 100 miles) improves proximate establishments' total-factor-productivity substantially more than distant R&D activity.
Because worker commuting patterns and R&D spillovers are more geographically bounded than the flow of commodities, the benefits emanating from pools of skilled labor and potential knowledge inflows will be more localized than the benefits from specialized suppliers.
As a result, we expect that the production weights for labor and R&D activity understate firms' incentives to co-locate for skilled labor and knowledge inflows, while the weight for materials overstates the importance of specialized suppliers.
To gain a better sense of how these under and overstatements alter the effective draw of each externality -what the result of production weights and location specificity would be together -we turn to prior empirical work. Rosenthal and Strange (2001) examine differences in the extent of agglomeration in U.S. manufacturing at the industry level and find that the explanatory power of Marshall's agglomeration economies differs when applied at three geographic levels. Labor-market pooling explains industry agglomeration at zip code, county, and state levels; access to intermediate inputs explains agglomeration only at the state level; and potential knowledge spillovers have effect at the zip code level. Applied to our setting, the consistent effect of labor market pooling across geographic levels, suggests that pools of skilled labor provide the greatest incentive to co-locate. Ellison, Glaeser, and Kerr (2007) examine colocation of U.S. manufacturing industries at the dyad-industry level and find that input-output dependencies are most likely to drive agglomeration, followed by labor pooling. As for intellectual spillovers, they do not find robust support for its role in agglomeration. Their results suggest for our setting that pools of specialized suppliers will provide the greatest incentive to co-locate.
These two studies suggest a greater importance for suppliers and labor than for knowledge inflows, but the relative merits of skilled labor and specialized suppliers remain unclear. For that reason, we are agnostic about this particular bilateral comparison, and work with two bilateral rankings instead. More formally:
H1. Skilled labor (share of same industry employment) and specialized suppliers (share of supplier-industry employment) will be more attractive than potential knowledge spillover (share of industry R&D activity).
Why are some firms more likely to pursue agglomeration economies?
The first and second layers of the framework assess the relative attraction of each agglomeration economy for the average firm. Our final step explores why and how individual firms will vary in their propensity to co-locate for each economy. With each economy offering reduced costs to proximate firms, we might expect geographic concentration to be universally appealing. To understand why this might not be the case, we examine how much proximate firms contribute to agglomeration economies, and whether their competitors can make use of those contributions. Shaver and Flyer (2000) make two fundamental observations about firms' contributions to proximate competitors and the impact of those contributions on co-location. First, firms not only benefit from agglomeration economies, but they also contribute to them. It is the collective activity of proximate firms that forms, maintains, and grows these public goods. Second, firms differ in how much they gain from and contribute to the pool. Shaver and Flyer suggest the benefits from agglomeration are asymmetric -that larger firms contribute more, and gain less, than their smaller competitors. 3 As a result, the net benefit of agglomeration may be far less for some firms than for others. In some cases, the net benefit may actually be negative, creating incentive to avoid co-location entirely. Specifically, they show that while co-location improves survival for average-sized firms, larger entrants are much less likely to locate near competitors.
Beyond how much a firm contributes to agglomeration economies, we must consider the usefulness of that contribution. A firm making a large contribution can be less concerned if competitors cannot make use of that contribution. Alcácer and Chung (2007) make this point in relation to knowledge spillovers. They argue that while some knowledge spills are easy to pick up, all knowledge is not accessible or useful to all firms. Some firms will not have the capacity to absorb knowledge gleaned from more-sophisticated competitors. As a result, technically advanced firms may be less vulnerable to knowledge outflows, and need not avoid locating among less-advanced competitors.
We generalize this limited usefulness argument and apply it to the three agglomeration economies. While some agglomeration economies benefit all firms, others require firms to possess relevant capabilities, skills, or experience in order to materially benefit. The presence of such entry hurdles can reduce firms' fears of helping competitors, which in turn reduces the need to avoid locations thick with other firms. While the utility of all three economies is somewhat constrained, we expect labor markets will be the easiest to leverage, followed by specialized suppliers and knowledge inflows from competitors.
Labor markets are relatively easy to penetrate because they are thick with information.
Job categories and professions are fairly well defined, as are relevant experience, skills, and training. For example the Bureau of Labor Statistics maintains the "Standard Occupation
Classification" with 820 classifications covering all possible professions. Because of such standardization on the supply side, firms looking to hire new employees all have similar potential access. 4 In classifications that it normally employs, any firm should be relatively well equipped to assess, hire, and integrate individuals into their organization. Thus any contributions that enlarge and deepen labor pools should be universally beneficial.
The market for suppliers is less accessible. The challenge for buying firms is the experiential nature of supply relationships -identifying good suppliers, engaging them, and working successfully with them -reduces accessibility for firms without such experience.
Relative to hiring labor, working with suppliers is a smaller-numbers situation: there are fewer market participants and firms use the market less frequently. This might favor economically larger firms, which use more suppliers in general and multiple suppliers for certain needs. In this way, large firms would be better prepared to leverage other firms' contributions to the base of specialized suppliers.
The usefulness of knowledge inflows from competitors is similarly limited, because absorbing knowledge requires that the receiving firm has the absorptive capacity to identify, obtain, and integrate useful knowledge. Knowledge outflows will vary in quality, with some readily gleaned by all, and others more opaque. As such, proximate firms with greater absorptive capacity will benefit more from locations with the potential for knowledge inflows.
4 A firm's efforts to access the market will determine differences between potential and actual market access.
The ordering of agglomeration economies' relative usefulness suggests that contributing to skilled labor pools would be most costly to firms, because these pools are easily accessed by competitors. In contrast, contributing to pools of specialized suppliers and knowledge outflows would be less costly, because competitors are less able to leverage these contributions for competitive advantage.
The value that firms place on each agglomeration economy will also vary by firm traits.
Following Shaver and Flyer, we expect that larger firms will make larger contributions to pools of skilled labor and specialized suppliers because they employ more workers and engage in more supplier activity. Similarly, following Alcácer and Chung, we expect that firms with greater technical capabilities will engage in more R&D activity than other firms, making them more likely to contribute knowledge outflows.
The relative value of each agglomeration economy, and the impact of firm size and technical capability, will lead to different firm behavior. Larger firms will be less attracted to locations with thick labor markets because these labor pools are easy for competitors to penetrate. In contrast, specialized suppliers and knowledge inflows are harder to leverage, making it less risky for larger or more technically advanced firms to pursue these economies.
Stated more formally, we expect:
H2a. Economically larger firms will be less strongly attracted (smaller firms more strongly attracted) to skilled labor (share of same industry employment).
H2b. Economically larger firms will be more strongly attracted (smaller firms less strongly attracted) to specialized suppliers (share of supplier industries employment).
H2c. Technical-leader firms will be more strongly attracted (laggard firms will be less strongly attracted) to potential knowledge spillovers (share of industry R&D activity).
Data
To assess the implications of our framework for firm behavior towards agglomeration economies, we examine how variation across locations in share of same-industry employment, supplier-industry employment, and industry R&D activity affects firms' location choices. To explain location choice as a function of both location-specific and firm-level traits, we draw upon several data sources.
Our dependent variable, the location within the U. with SIC codes in manufacturing (all four-digit SIC industries between 2000 and 3999) for 1985 through 1994. 5 We focus on manufacturing industries, rather than agriculture, mining or services, because we expect the impact of agglomeration economies on firms' location decisions to be the greatest.
We restrict our sample to transactions by firms that are first-time entrants because prior investments can influence subsequent location choices and create dependence among observations for the same firm. 6 We also restrict ourselves to firms making greenfield investments (excluding those that enter through acquisitions) so that we might observe firms making the least-constrained location choices. 7 We then match firms making these transactions For each transaction, investment location can be defined broadly (the Pacific Northwest, New England), or more narrowly (the Bay Area, the Boston metropolitan area). In an effort to identify geographic areas that mimic economic activity rather than state or administrative boundaries, the Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA) defined 170 economic areas spanning the continental U.S. 9 Each economic area consists of at least one node (a metropolitan or densely populated area that serves as center of economic activity) and the surrounding counties that are economically related to the node(s). Commuting patterns are the main factor used to determine economic relationships among counties. Each economic area includes, as far as possible, both the work site and residence of its labor force.
For our first location-specific independent variable, we use %_industry_employment, the percentage of workers in a given industry present in each economic area, a variable that is widely used in recent papers looking at the geographic concentration of U.S. manufacturing industries.
A location with a higher portion of existing-industry employment must have a greater amount of skilled labor with industry-specific attributes. We aggregate employment per industry-year from the county level to the economic area level using the definition of economic areas provided by the BEA. This, as well as all our focal variables, varies by economic area, industry, and year.
supplying industries present in a given economic area. This variable, which captures the existence of specialized suppliers, is constructed using the Benchmark Input-Output Accounts of the U.S. for 1992 from the Department of Commerce. The input-output accounts provide the types and amounts of commodities made by all industries, as well as which commodities, in what amounts, each industry uses. Using these commodities and quantities, we determine the fraction of inputs from all other industries used by each focal industry. 10 Then, to get our industryeconomic area-year level measures, we multiply these fractions by the corresponding percents of industry employment by economic area and then sum across all industries to get percent of related supplying-industry employment. While a focal industry can potentially be fed by many supplying industries, we limit ourselves to each focal industry's top ten supplying industries in constructing this measure, while excluding the focal industry itself as one of the top input providers (since we already explicitly capture this contribution in %_industry_employment).
These top ten supplying industries account for 63% of all inputs for the industries where firms in our sample invest.
For our third location-specific focal measure, we use %_industry_patents. We use patenting activity to proxy for potential knowledge spillovers similar to Ellison, Glaeser, and Kerr (2007) and Alcácer and Chung (2007) . We calculate patent stocks by industry, economic area, source and year using patent data from the Micropatent dataset, which contains all information listed on the front page of every U.S. patent granted since 1975. We use four variables to characterize patents: inventor location (for economic area), technological class and 10 Due to the I-O accounts being commodity based, we are unable to match some commodities to SIC industries, resulting in the loss of some commodity flows in determining intra-industry supply linkages. Also when constructing the similar %_industry_buyers measure as a control variable, additional losses occur. Commodities can also be exported or consumed by federal, state, and local government. We exclude these "final use" categories from being considered as buying industries since an appropriate geographic location of such buyers is problematic.
subclass (for industry), and filing date (for year). The dataset provides 499,271 patents whose first inventors are located in the U.S. and whose application dates fall between 1985 and 1994.
The location of a patent is determined by the address of its first inventor. Most patents list one inventor; when multiple inventors are listed they tend to locate in the same economic area.
Since we need information about city and state to map locations to economic areas, we exclude patents for which this information is not available, yielding a sample of 496,275 locations, representing 99% of the patents granted to assignees in the U.S. that were applied for between 1985 and 1994.
We map technological classes and subclasses onto industries using a concordance that links the International Patent Classification (IPC) system to the U.S. Standard Industrial Classification (SIC) system at the four-digit SIC level (see Silverman (1999) Finally, we identify the time dimension based on when the patent application was filed.
The application date is the closest available to the generation of an innovation. We also calculate stock using the date the patent was granted, with very similar results. With economic area, industry, and year defined for each patent, we calculate patent stocks with different time lengths (three-, five-, and seven-year averages preceding the focal year) to smooth possible yearly fluctuations and to capture continuity in technological activity. Results are similar using any of the averages; subsequent results are based upon three-year averages. We then use these threeyear averages to calculate percentages by economic area, industry, and year. %_ind_employment_zero and %_ind_patents_zero. These dummy variables should take on strongly negative values -the lack of any direct employment or research activity will make a location much less attractive for a potential entrant.
For our first firm-specific trait, firm technical capabilities, we use R&D intensity (R&D spending scaled by sales) measures obtained from Worldscope. 13 To classify firms as technical leaders or laggards, we use the year of entry and compare each firm's R&D intensity to the average R&D intensity for all U.S. firms in the same 4-digit industry. 14 Using industry-year R&D intensity data was drawn from Compustat, we identify quartiles of R&D intensity. A firm whose R&D efforts would place it in the top quartile of R&D intensity in the U.S. is designated a leader firm; a firm whose R&D efforts are below the top quartile of U.S. firms is designated a laggard firm. We use the quartile definition instead of the mean or median because the R&D 12 While there are 337,850 total cells possible (233 4-digit industries x 10 years x 145 economic areas), there are not entries into all industries in all years. On average across industries, there is only entry in 2.15 of the possible 10 years. 13 Most first-time entrants are in the same industry as their parents. From our sample, 63% of all entries are in the same 4-digit code as their parent's primary 4-digit SIC and 93% are in the same 3-digit code as the parent. 14 We use firms in the U.S. as our comparison group given our interest in location behavior among first-time entrants to strategically benefit from agglomeration economies. The bulk of creation and maintenance of agglomeration economies is going to come from the presence of proximate U.S. firms.
intensity of all foreign entrants to the U.S. is quite high, and using a lower threshold would lead to most entrants being defined as leaders.
For our second firm-specific trait, firm economic size, we use a measure of total firm assets, also obtained from Worldscope. To classify firms as economically large or small, we compare each firm's total assets to the total assets for all U.S. firms in the same 4-digit industry.
A firm whose total assets are above the top quartile of U.S. firms is designated a large firm; a firm whose total assets are less than the top quartile of U.S. firms is designated a small firm.
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[ Table 1 about here]
In addition to these focal variables, we need to control for other characteristics, such as access to consumers, market growth, low-priced inputs such as land, etc. Collecting an exhaustive set of these variables at the economic-area level for all industries is practically impossible, so we use three variables to proxy for the host of attributes that attract entrants.
Our first and second control variables are establishment_growth and employment_growth.
Both variables control for location-industry-time specific heterogeneity that can influence location decisions. Our establishment and employment data are drawn from County Business Patterns reports from the Bureau of Economic Analysis for 1985 to 1994.
Our third control variable is %_industry_buyers, which is constructed in a similar manner to the focal variable %_industry_suppliers, but uses the input-output tables to identify purchasing/buying industries of the focal industry. %_industry_buyers is an important control for two reasons. First, proximity to buyers should be an important consideration when firms decide 15 Optimally we would use the entrant's establishment size, since it is the economic size of the investment that is contributing to and drawing upon externalities. However, entrant size is only intermittently reported (about 40% of the time) and is noisy itself since a firm might subsequently add to an initial investment. Instead of introducing this additional source of noise and losing many observations, we use parent-firm-level information for both entrants and U.S. comparators. While noisy, this measure performs well -consistent with our theoretic expectations -in our subsequent analysis.
where to locate. And because an industry's buyers and suppliers are likely to be somewhat overlapped geographically, including suppliers only would create a classic omitted-variables problem: any significance of the omitted-buyer's proximity would inappropriately load onto the included measure for supplier proximity. Second, beyond the other control variables, we want a control at the same level of analysis -industry-location-year -as the focal variables. Failing to do so would be another source of an omitted-variables problem.
Finally, following Head, Ries, and Swenson (1995), we use alternative specific constants (ASCs) (dummy variables per economic area) to capture time-invariant attributes that may be attracting entrants. Examples of attributes captured by ASCs would be land area, population density, right-to-work laws, tax rates, and coastal location. To the extent that such attributes are relatively constant across time, they are reflected by the ASCs.
Method
We examine the attractiveness of same-industry employment, supplier-industry employment, and industry R&D activity, as well as how this attractiveness varies with firm heterogeneity.
We model the location-choice process, where firms choose one of 170 economic areas, through a conditional-logit model as described by McFadden (1974) . Conditional logit has been used extensively for cases where choices are made from a large set of possible geographical locations (Head et al. 1995; Chung and Alcácer 2002) .
The conditional logistic regression is similar to the ordinary logistic regression models except that the data occur in groups. The idea is to fit a logistic model that explains why a given choice has a positive outcome in a group (choice set) conditional on the other existing alternatives in the choice set. The conditional-logit model is specified as follows. Let V ij represent the value to firm i of choosing location j. V ij depends on location characteristics that vary by industry, X ij , according to:
Let Y ij be our dependent variable equal to 1 if firm i chooses location j and 0 otherwise.
Assuming that e ij are independent and identically distributed with Type I Extreme Value Distribution, then the probability that location i is chosen is Since 25 economic areas are never chosen in our sample, our choice set is reduced from 171 to 145 potential locations. 16 While eliminating these choices would initially seem to bias our estimates, our estimates are unaffected due to the conditional logit's independence to irrelevant alternatives (IIA) property: that the relative odds between two alternatives is the same regardless of what other alternatives are available (or unavailable). For example, Train (2003) shows that estimated model parameters are consistent when using only a subset of alternatives in the decision making process.
Note that the conditional-logit model focuses on location traits instead of firm traits. Firm characteristics would be invariant within a choice set, appearing in both the numerator and denominator of equation 2 and dropping from the estimation. Chooser's traits can be modeled by interacting terms (multiplying economic area traits by firm traits) or by splitting the sample into sub-samples according to specific firm traits. We choose the second option for two reasons. First, it offers a more parsimonious presentation of the results because it uses fewer regressors than models with interaction effects; second, it avoids numerous cross-terms that are difficult to interpret with non-linear models. For example, Ai and Norton (2003) find that "the magnitude of the interaction effect in nonlinear models does not equal the marginal effect of the interaction term, can be of opposite sign, and its statistical significance is not calculated by standard software." Also, while interaction effects are by definition co-linear with the variables being interacted, splitting samples does not increase co-linearity levels. Finally, using sub-samples allows all variables in the model to vary for each sub-sample, rather than using interaction terms where only those variables explicitly interacted will vary. Table 2 provides an overview of each agglomeration economy's attractiveness. The first column is a benchmark specification of control variables. The subsequent columns introduce each independent variable separately.
Results
[ Table 2 about here]
Focusing on the measures for agglomeration externalities, across all models, we see that %_ind_employment is consistently positive and significant. Including the zero dummy variable, %_ind_employment_zero drops the magnitude of %_ind_employment slightly, but otherwise remains very significant. Assessing the improvement from including %_ind_employment_zero, we look at the difference in log likelihood between columns 2 and 3: -2497.01 vs. -2476.21 for a difference of 20.80, which is significant at better than a 1% level. %_ind_suppliers is also consistently positive and significant across all models. For %_ind_patents, while consistently positive, it is only significant in column 5 before %_ind_patents_zero is included. Looking at the difference in log likelihood between columns 5 and 6, including %_ind_patents_zero does not significantly improve overall model fit. 17 We investigate the marginal significance of %_ind_patents further by separating out industries that are more R&D intensive later in the paper.
Our main interest in this table is to compare the externalities' magnitudes of effect. To do so, we use the odds-ratios, which due to the conditional logit's form are exponentiated values of the coefficient estimates. Using odd-ratios' values from column 6, we see that %_ind_employment and %_ind_suppliers have similar magnitudes of effect; their odds-ratios are 1.090 and 1.089 vs. 1.007 for %_ind_patents. Since the corresponding independent variables are expressed as percentages, the 1.090 indicates that if an economic area had a 1% increase in %_industry employment it would lead to a 9.0% increase in likelihood of being chosen. The odds-ratios result and corresponding Welch's t-tests for differences indicate that skilled labor and specialized suppliers are of about the same attractiveness for firms, and that both are at least ten times more attractive than potential knowledge spillovers. This ordering is consistent with hypothesis H1.
Of note also is the odds-ratio for the zero employment dummy variable, %_ind_employment_zero. The odds-ratio from column 6 is 0.250, which means that an economic area that has no relevant employment is four times less likely of being chosen relative to if it had any industry employment.
Having established relative attractiveness across agglomeration economies, we turn to firms' strategic response. Table 3 splits the sample along the two key dimensions of firm heterogeneity: firm economic size and firm R&D intensity. Column 1 is again the baseline model of all firms -identical to that shown in Table 2 , column 6. Columns 2 and 3 present the results for the split by firm economic size, while columns 4 and 5 present the results for the split by firm R&D intensity
[ Table 3 about here]
Looking at %_ind_employment in columns 2 and 3 where the firms are split into those that are economically large and economically small, the coefficient estimates are both positive and significant. Of note, the coefficient for the large-firm group is substantially smaller than for the small-firm group: 0.0757 versus 0.1284 (using the Welch's t-test, this difference is significant at more than a 1% level). Looking at the corresponding odds-ratios (1.079 and 1.137)
suggests that larger firms are roughly 40% less attracted than small firms to locations thick with skilled labor. This finding is consistent with hypothesis H2a -larger firms would be less attracted to locations thick with skilled labor. Another consistent explanation is that larger firms are better able to attract workers to wherever they locate and can be less concerned with existing pools of labor. Our difference between large and small firms is also consistent with Shaver and Flyer (2000) , who find that large establishments are about 40% less attracted to locations thick with same-industry establishments.
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Also looking at %_ind_suppliers in columns 2 and 3, the coefficient estimates for large and small firms are starkly different: positive and significant for large firms, but slightly negative and non-significant for small firms. This suggests that only large firms are drawn to externalities emanating from specialized suppliers. This finding is consistent with hypothesis H2b -limited accessibility reduces concerns about aiding competitors: firms need appropriate experience to gain from the presence of specialized suppliers, which large firms are on average more likely to possess. As a result, large firms can enjoy agglomeration economies without concern over aiding smaller competitors.
The lack of significance for %_ind_suppliers with small firms is somewhat surprisingas we might expect such firms to rely on the existing infrastructure of suppliers. Among this population at least, it appears that small firms' location choices are driven not by the presence of suppliers, but by availability of skilled labor and potential knowledge inflows from competitors (the coefficient estimates for %_ind_employment and %_ind_patents are strongly significant).
Both of these effects may indicate the importance of scale. Small firms are not responsible for enough economic activity to encourage workers to relocate, making them more dependent upon existing pools of labor. Similarly, small firms don't independently conduct enough technical activity to keep pace with changing technologies and thus have to rely on the proximate activity of other firms as well.
Finally we look at %_ind_patents in columns 4 and 5, where firms are split into those that are more and less R&D intensive. Here again we expect to find that R&D intensive firms are more attracted to R&D intensive locations than firms less reliant upon on R&D, but find little evidence of variation. Coefficient estimates for both leader and laggard firms are positive, but not significant. This lack of significance is similar to prior research by Alcácer and Chung (2007) . However, different from here, they then disaggregate by knowledge source (academic, industry, and government) and amount (high, low, and zero) to show several strong relationships.
We don't pursue similar disaggregation, because our interest is in assessing firms' attraction to each of Marshall's three agglomeration economies instead of going into greater depth with a single one. These results for potential knowledge spillover, combined with our findings for the other economies, suggest that firms' considering new locations will place more value on labor and suppliers than they place on potential knowledge inflows from competitors.
In summary, our results show that %_ind_employment and %_ind_suppliers are several times more attractive to firms choosing locations than %_ind_patents. Firms vary in their response to these economies depending upon whether they are economically large or small.
Consistent with concerns about aiding proximate competitors, large firms tend to be less attracted to locations with high %_ind_employment. In contrast, large firms appear more drawn to locations with high %_ind_suppliers, which is consistent with the limited accessibility of contributions to pools of supplier activity. Relative to these distinct location behaviors, firm response to potential knowledge spillovers is minor.
Robustness
Before settling on these results, we conduct additional tests to assess their robustness. In particular for H1 -skilled labor and specialized suppliers being more of a draw than potential knowledge inflows --the attraction of each agglomeration economy may vary based upon how intensively it is used in certain industries. For example, firms in labor-intensive industries might place a greater emphasis on geographic concentrations of skilled labor than on specialized suppliers or potential knowledge inflows. Similarly, firms in supplier-intensive industries might be more drawn to supplier activity; or firms in R&D-intensive industries might be more drawn to knowledge inflows. As such, we split our sample by labor intensity, extent of suppliers used, and R&D intensity.
To assign industries for labor intensity into high and low categories, we use the National Bureau of Economic Research's Manufacturing Industry Productivity Database, which provides industries' value-added as well as the inputs used in production. To determine labor intensity, we use an industry's ratio of total payroll divided by total value-added, averaged for the 9 years of our investigation, 1985-1994. We designate industries above the median as labor intensive and those below as not. To assign industries to high supplier-use or low supplier-use, we use the Benchmark Input-Output Accounts of the U.S. for 1992 from the Department of Commerce, which reports for each industry the proportion of value coming from supplying industries. We also split industries into those that are more and less knowledge-intense. To assign industries to high-tech and low-tech categories, we follow the OECD classification from the report OECD Science, Technology and Industry Scoreboard (1999) . Labor-intensive transactions make up 45.7% of all transactions, while 44.6% of transactions are classified as high supplier-use, and 60.9% of transactions are classified as high-tech. Results appear in Table 4 below.
[ Table 4 about here]
In Table 4 , column 1 is the baseline specification -identical to that shown in Table 2 , column 6. Columns 2 and 3 present the results for the split by industry labor-intensity, columns 4
and 5 are for the split by industry-supplier-intensity, and columns 6 and 7 present results for the split by industry R&D-intensity.
Looking at %_ind_employment in columns 2 and 3, we see that both coefficient estimates are statistically significant, but they differ in magnitude. As we'd expect, the attraction to pools of labor in labor-intensive industries is greater: 0.0979 vs. 0.0756. This difference in coefficient estimates is strongly statistically significant using the Welch's t-test. Also of interest is how the coefficients for industry suppliers and patents differ for these two industry groups. With laborintensive industries, only industry employment is a draw; suppliers and patents are strong draws in less labor-intensive industries. This is sensible, since by definition those two categories would be of greater importance in less labor-intensive industries. Looking at the odds-ratios even in this less labor-intensive group, the draw of employment and suppliers is still much greater than it is for patents: 1.079 and 1.207 versus 1.018.
Looking at %_ind_suppliers in columns 4 and 5, we see that the coefficient estimates are substantially different. For firms in high supplier-use industries, the estimate is positive and significant, while for firms in the low supplier-use group, the estimate is positive but not significant. The coefficient estimate for the high supplier-use industry group is also substantially larger than the baseline all-industry sample: 0.1504 vs. 0.0857. Analogously, the odds-ratio is also greater: 1.162 versus 1.089. Unsurprisingly, these differences suggest that the attractiveness of agglomerated supplier activity is more important for firms in industries that rely heavily on suppliers.
Looking at %_ind_patents in columns 6 and 7, the coefficient estimates are both positive but not significant. While we might expect a positive and significant estimate for the high R&D-intensity group, this basic split is perhaps still too aggregated to reveal an effect.
With these three industry splits, we see that even when examining industries that use certain inputs more intensively, hypothesis H1's expected relationship remains -skilled labor and specialized suppliers are more attractive to firms than potential knowledge spillover.
Conclusions
Locations thick with similar economic activity expose firms to pools of skilled labor, specialized suppliers, and potential inter-firm knowledge spillovers that can provide firms with opportunities for competitive advantage. While certainly attractive, the draw of these agglomeration economies will vary since firms contribute differentially to the formation, maintenance, and growth of these agglomeration economies. As a result, firms may be wary of indirectly aiding their competitors by co-locating.
To better understand how firms' respond to agglomeration economies, we develop a framework of three interconnecting layers. The first layer uses the long-standing literature in economics on production functions to establish a baseline for each agglomeration economy's relative value; an economy should be more valuable if it provides inputs that firms use more intensively. The second layer modifies this baseline by examining whether particular economies are location-specific; firms have more incentive to co-locate when an economy's benefits cannot be leveraged from afar. The final layer addresses why individual firms vary in their propensity to co-locate with competitors; contributing greater amounts to agglomeration economies may decrease firms' incentive to co-locate, though this concern will be reduced when competitors are unable to use those contributions.
The framework generates two novel predictions. First, pools of skilled labor and specialized suppliers will attract more firms than potential knowledge spillovers. Second, about the risk of aiding competitors might be reduced by an agglomeration economy's relative usefulness: large firms might shy away from locations thick with skilled labor, but the more limited accessibility of their contributions to supplier networks would allow larger firms to locate with competitors. Similarly, the limited usefulness of leaked knowledge would allow technical leaders to locate with less-advanced competitors.
We find empirical results consistent with the first prediction and somewhat with the second. For first-time foreign entrants to the U.S. making greenfield investments in 1985-1994, we find that industry employment and supplier activity are about 10 times more attractive than industry patent stocks, suggesting that firms, on average, place more value on pools of skilled labor and specialized suppliers than on potential knowledge inflows from competitors. The priority placed on labor and suppliers persists even for industries that are more R&D intensive.
Introducing key dimensions of firms' heterogeneity reveals that economically larger firms are less drawn to industry employment, but are more drawn to supplier industry activity. This paired finding suggests that concern about aiding competitors is strong when competitors can leverage agglomeration economies for strategic advantage, and weak when they cannot.
For the strategy literature, our intent is to provide a comprehensive, consistent, and cohesive structure around firm's location behavior for Marshall's three types of externalities.
The framework disentangles each agglomeration economy from the collective, aggregated effect and in doing so provides an examination of what drives firm variation for each of Marshall's externalities. Once disentangled, the framework highlights voids, some of which we have addressed empirically here. This structure both orients and integrates extant research, which allows us to resolve some apparent contradictions. For example, Shaver and Flyer (2000) find that new entrants might shy away from locating with competitors, while Alcácer and Chung (2007) find that new entrants might be drawn to competitors. Putting their studies in context of the framework, there are two key differences: (1) Shaver and Flyer examine the set of three agglomeration economies collectively, while Alcácer and Chung only look at knowledge spillovers; and (2) concerns about aiding competitors predominate for the three agglomeration economies in aggregate, but wane due to limited accessibility when looking only at knowledge spillovers.
Our findings also contribute to the economics literature on agglomeration. Work by Rosenthal and Strange (2001) and Ellison, Glaeser, and Kerr (2007) A number of caveats for our results remain. Distinguishing the three agglomeration economies from one another depends upon our measures being strong enough to capture -and yet sharp enough to separate -the distinct effects. Undoubtedly there is some overlap among our measures. For example, from a theoretic standpoint, skilled labor is one of the main conduits through which knowledge would spill. While non-overlapped measures are desirable, we are hard pressed to find sharper measures especially when the externalities are theoretically entangled. We are not unique in this area; the research on which we build faces the same measurement challenge. Another limitation is our particular context of new entrants into the U.S., which certainly reduces the generality of our results. The idiosyncrasies of entering firms' motives, which are driven by the prevailing economic topology, are likely specific to the U.S.
Overall, our framework suggests how firms would react towards each agglomeration economy. We theoretically and empirically separate the set, and show that firms' location choices balance concerns about aiding competitors with a recognition that some agglomeration economies will be of limited use to others. This integrative framework is important since understanding firms' behavior towards these agglomeration economies is a large component of what drives firms' location strategy, which can, in turn, be a source of competitive advantage. standard error in parentheses, odds-ratio in square brackets * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% for 2-tailed tests standard error in parentheses, odds-ratio in square brackets * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% for 2-tailed tests 
